Friday, November 28, 2008

Possible Geopolitical Consequences of the Mumbai Attacks

If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.

Read an analysis by Startfor, received via e-mail:

At this point the situation on the ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the likely consequences of the attack are less murky.

We will begin by assuming that the attackers are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite clearly that this was a carefully planned, well-executed attack.

Given this, the Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power: Pakistan. In that case it can hold a nation-state responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to strengthen the government’s internal position by invoking nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This is not to say that there are no outside powers involved — simply that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim there were.

That, in turn, will plunge India and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002. If the Pakistanis are understood to be responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them responsible, and that means they will have to take action in retaliation — otherwise, the Indian government’s domestic credibility will plunge. The shape of the crisis, then, will consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and public. This demand will come parallel to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S. President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.

If that happens, Pakistan will find itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be threatening action — deliberately vague but menacing — along with the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked. If the attacks are traced to Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of inauguration day.

There is a precedent for this. In 2002 there was an attack on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India and Pakistan, in which the United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.

In the current iteration, the demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions. Thus the crisis will directly intersect U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.

It is not clear the degree to which the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn’t matter. Either way, India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign powers and domestic realities. Given the circumstances, massive destabilization is possible — never a good thing with a nuclear power.

This is thinking far ahead of the curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we don’t know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically that they weren’t involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on the ground clarifies itself.

Thursday, November 20, 2008

BNP is going to election

Just learnt BNP is going to participate in the 18th Dec election.

2. What happened yesterday was a second coup!

Wednesday, November 19, 2008

Is everything OK in Bangladesh?

The government will announce around 3 PM today a new poll date, 28 or 30 December. The question is why CEC is not announcing it.

Sources saying some discord surfaced when CEC met CA yesterday. CEC wanted to resign, but he was restrained.

Meanwhile, the President house has collected speech of Chief Advisor, given on 21st January 2007.

Is everything OK in Bangladesh? Things can go either way, so hope for the best, but prepare for the worst.

Friday, November 14, 2008

Some probable scenarios about Bangladesh elections

No election scenario

1. Election is likely to be delayed by 10 days or few weeks. End week of January is the likely date. If it is pushed beyond January, AL will take to streets, defying emergency. Bloody battles are expected.

2. When election is pushed back, Fakhruddin will resign. His house in USA is being cleaned up. Other advisers are willing to continue but won't be able to stay. (The Government diary for 2009 is likely to keep names of Advisers intact!)

3. Some sort of national government involving reformists factions of the parties will be formed by the president, along with Kamal, B Chowdhury etc. Before leaving, Fakhruddin will formalise National Security Council. If FA can't make it, then new national government will give birth to NSC hurriedly. At that point President will be asked to leave and situations will be made calling Moeen to take over as President. He will decline initially, however, under pressure, he will oblige for 'national interest'.

3. Under this scenario, the election will be postponed for an indefinite period. Both Hasina and Khaleda will be asked to rally behind, if they disagree, they will be put back to sub-jail again, alongwith those politicians received bails so far.

4. Jamaat will come under pressure at this point and a war crime commission will be formed to try collaborators. The national government would want to put an end to this issue, so the trial would continue for few more years before Jamaat's leadership are put behind bars permanently.

Election scenario

1. BNP is likely to participate, without Khaleda. She is not likely to participate as she will have to submit educational certificate under revised RPO which will show her birth date different from what she has been observing.Also, once she submits it, EC will try to malign her by investigating if certificate is genuine or not. This will lead to more confusion and chaos. She wants to avoid this and if that happens we will hear a different story from her that she would like to become Bangladesh's Sonia.

2. Hasina-Khaleda dialogue is meant to prevent Moeen from becoming the president. Both parties are also considering power sharing.


Election or no election, chaos is confirmed. Welcome to chaotic 2009 and prepare for a longer period of 'unelected governance'.

Wednesday, November 5, 2008