Obama's first 100 days and beyond

George Friedman of Stratfor has written this piece, received via e-mail:

U.S. presidential candidates run for office as if they would be free to act however they wish once elected. But upon election, they govern as they must. The freedom of the campaign trail contrasts sharply with the constraints of reality.

The test of a president is how effectively he bridges the gap between what he said he would do and what he finds he must do. Great presidents achieve this seamlessly, while mediocre presidents never recover from the transition. All presidents make the shift, including Obama, who spent his first hundred days on this task.

Obama won the presidency with a much smaller margin than his supporters seem to believe. Despite his wide margin in the Electoral College, more than 47 percent of voters cast ballots against him. Obama was acutely aware of this and focused on making certain not to create a massive split in the country from the outset of his term. He did this in foreign policy by keeping Robert Gates on as defense secretary, bringing in Hillary Clinton, Richard Holbrooke and George Mitchell in key roles and essentially extrapolating from the Bush foreign policy. So far, this has worked. Obama’s approval rating rests at 69 percent, which The Washington Post notes is average for presidents at the hundred-day mark.

Obama, of course, came into office in circumstances he did not anticipate when he began campaigning — namely, the financial and economic crisis that really began to bite in September 2008. Obama had no problem bridging the gap between campaign and governance with regard to this matter, as his campaign neither anticipated nor proposed strategies for the crisis — it just hit. The general pattern for dealing with the crisis was set during the Bush administration, when the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board put in place a strategy of infusing money into failing institutions to prevent what they feared would be a calamitous economic chain reaction.

Obama continued the Bush policy, though he added a stimulus package. But such a package had been discussed in the Bush administration, and it is unlikely that Sen. John McCain would have avoided creating one had he been elected. Obviously, the particular projects funded and the particular interests favored would differ between McCain and Obama, but the essential principle would not.

The financial crisis would have been handled the same way — just as everything from the Third World debt crisis to the Savings and Loan crisis would have been handled the same way no matter who was president. Under either man, the vast net worth of the United States (we estimate it at about $350 trillion) would have been tapped by printing money and raising taxes, and U.S. assets would have been used to underwrite bad investments, increase consumption and build political coalitions through pork. Obama had no plan for this. Instead, he expanded upon the Bush administration solution and followed tradition.

The Reality of International Affairs
The manner in which Obama was trapped by reality is most clear with regard to international affairs. At the heart of Obama’s campaign was the idea that one of the major failures of the Bush administration was alienating the European allies of the United States. Obama argued that a more forthcoming approach to the Europeans would yield a more forthcoming response. In fact, the Europeans were no more forthcoming with Obama than they were with Bush.

Obama’s latest trip to Europe focused on two American demands and one European — primarily German — demand. Obama wanted the Germans to increase their economic stimulus plan because Germany is the largest exporter in the world. With the United States stimulating its economy, the Germans could solve their economic problem simply by increasing exports into the United States. This would limit job creation in the United States, particularly because German exports involve automobiles as well as other things, and Obama has struggled to build domestic demand for U.S. autos. Thus, he wanted the Germans to build domestic demand and not just rely on the United States to pull Germany out of recession. But the Germans refused, arguing that they could not afford a major stimulus now (when in fact they have no reason to be flexible, because the U.S. stimulus is going to help them no matter what Germany does).

Germany’s and France’s unwillingness to provide substantially more support in Afghanistan gave Obama a second disappointment. Some European troops were sent, but their numbers were few and their mission was limited to a very short period. (In some cases, the European force contribution will focus on training indigenous police officers, which will take a year or more to really have an impact.) The French and Germans essentially were as unwilling to deal with Obama as they were with Bush on this matter.

The Europeans, on the other hand, wanted a major effort by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Central European banking system, largely owned by banks from more established European countries, has reached a crisis state because of aggressive lending policies. The Germans in particular don’t want to bail out these banks; they want the IMF to do so. Put differently, they want the United States, China and Japan to help underwrite the European banking system. Obama did agree to contribute to this effort, but not nearly on the scale the Europeans wanted.

On the whole, the Europeans gave two big nos, while the Americans gave a mild yes. In substantive terms, the U.S.-European relationship is no better than it was under Bush. In terms of perception, however, the Obama administration managed a brilliant coup, shifting the focus to the changed atmosphere that prevailed at the meeting. Indeed, all parties wanted to emphasize the atmospherics, and judging from media coverage, they succeeded. The trip accordingly was perceived as a triumph.

Campaign Promises and Public Perception
This is not a trivial achievement. There are campaign promises, there is reality and there is public perception. All presidents must move from campaigning to governing; extremely skilled presidents manage the shift without appearing duplicitous. At least in the European case, Obama has managed the shift without suffering political damage. His core supporters appear prepared to support him independent of results. And that is an important foundation for effective governance.

We can see the same continuity in his treatment of Russia. When he ran for president, Obama pledged to abandon the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployment in Poland amid a great show made about resetting U.S. Russia policy. On taking office, however, he encountered the reality of the Russian position, which is that Russia wants to be the pre-eminent power in the former Soviet Union. The Bush administration took the position that the United States must be free to maintain bilateral relations with any country, to include the ability to extend NATO membership to interested countries. Obama has reaffirmed this core U.S. position.

The United States has asked for Russian help in two areas. First, Washington asked for a second supply line into Afghanistan. Moscow agreed so long as no military equipment was shipped in. Second, Washington offered to withdraw its BMD system from Poland in return for help from Moscow in blocking Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles. The Russians refused, understanding that the offer on BMD was not worth removing a massive thorn (i.e., Iran) from the Americans’ side.

In other words, U.S.-Russian relations are about where they were in the Bush administration, and Obama’s substantive position is not materially different from the Bush administration’s position. The BMD deal remains in place, the United States is not depending on Russian help on logistics in Afghanistan, and Washington has not backed off on the principle of NATO expansion (even if expansion is most unlikely).

In Iraq, Obama has essentially followed the reality created under the Bush administration, shifting withdrawal dates somewhat but following the Petraeus strategy there and extending it — or trying to extend it — to Afghanistan. The Pakistani problem, of course, presents the greatest challenge (as it would have for any president), and Obama is coping with it to the extent possible.

Obama’s managing of perceptions as opposed to actually making policy changes shows up most clearly in regard to Iran. Obama tried to open the door to Tehran by indicating that he was prepared to talk to the Iranians without preconditions — that is, without any prior commitment on the part of the Iranians regarding nuclear development. The Iranians reacted by rejecting the opening, essentially saying Obama’s overture was merely a gesture, not a substantial shift in American policy.

The Iranians are, of course, quite correct in this. Obama fully understands that he cannot shift policy on Iran without a host of regional complications. For example, the Saudis would be enormously upset by such an opening, while the Syrians would have to re-evaluate their entire position on openings to Israel and the United States. Changing U.S. Iranian policy is hard to do. There is a reason Washington has the policy it does, and that reason extends beyond presidents and policymakers.

When we look at Obama’s substantive foreign policy, we see continuity rather than changes. Certainly, the rhetoric has changed, and that is not insignificant; atmospherics do play a role in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, when we look across the globe, we see the same configuration of relationships, the same partners, the same enemies and the same ambiguity that dominates most global relations.

Turkey and the Substantial U.S. Shift
One substantial shift has taken place, however, and that one is with Turkey. The Obama administration has made major overtures to Turkey in multiple forms, from a presidential visit to putting U.S. anti-piracy vessels under Turkish command. These are not symbolic moves. The United States needs Turkey to counterbalance Iran, protect U.S. interests in the Caucasus, help stabilize Iraq, serve as a bridge to Syria and help in Afghanistan. Obama has clearly shifted strategy here in response to changing conditions in the region.

Intriguingly, the change in U.S.-Turkish relations never surfaced as even a minor issue during the U.S. presidential campaign. It emerged after the election because of changes in the configuration of the international system. Shifts in Russian policy, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and shifts within Turkey that allowed the country to begin its return to the international arena all came together to make this necessary, and Obama responded.

None of this is designed to denigrate Obama in the least. While many of his followers may be dismayed, and while many of his critics might be unwilling to notice, the fact is that a single concept dominated Obama’s first hundred days: continuity. In the face of the realities of his domestic political position and the U.S. strategic position, as well as the economic crisis, Obama did what he had to do, and what he had to do very much follow from what Bush did. It is fascinating that both Obama’s supporters and his critics think he has made far more changes than he really has.

Of course, this is only the first hundred days. Presidents look for room to maneuver after they do what they need to do in the short run. Some presidents use that room to pursue policies that weaken, and even destroy, their presidencies. Others find ways to enhance their position. But normally, the hardest thing a president faces is finding the space to do the things he wants to do rather than what he must do. Obama came through the first hundred days following the path laid out for him. It is only in Turkey where he made a move that he wasn’t compelled to make just now, but that had to happen at some point. It will be interesting to see how many more such moves he makes.

Obama's two-pronged foreign policy

Courtesy of Stratfor:

By Rodger Baker

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is making her first official overseas visit, with scheduled stops in Tokyo; Jakarta, Indonesia; Seoul, South Korea; and Beijing. The choice of Asia as her first destination is intended to signal a more global focus for U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration, as opposed to the heavy emphasis on the Middle East and South Asia seen in the last years of the Bush administration. It also represents the kickoff of an ambitious travel plan that will see Clinton visiting numerous countries across the globe in a bid to project the image of a more cooperative U.S. administration.

Clinton’s Asian expedition is not the first overseas visit by a key member of the new administration. Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Germany for the Munich Security Conference, where he faced the Russians. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell has finished his first trip to his area of responsibility, and is already planning a return visit to the Middle East. And Richard Holbrooke, special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, has visited both South Asian countries in addition to making a “listening” stop in India.

The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy
As with any new U.S. presidency, there will be a period of reshaping policy, of setting priorities, and of balancing internal differences within the Obama administration. The various individuals and visits cataloged above in part reflect the Obama administration’s emerging foreign policy.

A two-pronged Obama foreign policy approach is unfolding. The first prong, relating to the general tenor of foreign relations, involves a modern application of the “speak softly and carry a big stick” approach. The second prong, relating to the distribution of power within the administration, involves a centralization of foreign policy centering on a stronger and expanded National Security Council (NSC) and relies on special envoys for crisis areas, leaving the secretary of state to shape foreign perceptions rather than policy.

The Obama administration faced mixed expectations as it came into office. Perhaps the most far-reaching expectation on the international front was the idea that the Obama administration would somehow be the antithesis of the previous Bush administration. Whereas Bush often was portrayed as a unilateralist “cowboy,” constantly confronting others and never listening to allies (much less competitors), it was thought that Obama somehow would remake America into a nation that withheld its military power and instead confronted international relations via consultations and cooperation. In essence, the Bush administration was seen as aggressive and unwilling to listen, while an Obama administration was expected to be more easily shaped and manipulated.

Anticipation of a weaker administration created a challenge for Obama from the start. While many of his supporters saw him as the anti-Bush, the new president had no intention of shifting America to a second-tier position or making the United States isolationist. Obama’s focus on reducing U.S. forces in Iraq and the discussions during Clinton’s confirmation hearing of reducing the military’s role in reconstruction operations did not reflect an anti-military bias or even new ideas, but something Defense Secretary Robert Gates had advocated for under former U.S. President George W. Bush. A reshaping of the U.S. military will in fact take place over the course of Obama’s term in office. But the decision to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq is not unique to this administration; it is merely recognition of the reality of the limitations of military resources.

Diplomacy and Military Power
The new administration has applied this decision as the basis of a strategy to refocus the military on its core competencies and rebuild the military’s strength and readiness, using that as the strong and stable framework from which to pursue an apparently more cooperative foreign policy. U.S. diplomatic power needs a strong military, and operations in Iraq have drained U.S. military power — something highlighted by the U.S. inability to act on its policies when the Russians moved in on Georgia.

It is not only U.S. political power that is reinforced by military power, but U.S. economic strength as well. Control of the world’s sea-lanes — and increasingly, control of outer space — is what ensures the security of U.S. economic links abroad. In theory, the United States can thus interdict competitors’ supply lines and economic ties while protecting its own.

Despite globalization and greater economic ties, physical power still remains the strongest backer to diplomacy. Ideology alone will not change the world, much less the actions of so-called rogue states or even pirates along the Somali coast. The first principal of Obama’s foreign policy, then, will be making sure it has big stick to carry, one freed from long-term reconstruction commitments or seemingly intractable situations such as Iraq. Only with an available and effective military can one afford to speak softly without being trod upon.

Rebuilding U.S. military readiness and strength is not going to be easy. Iraq and Afghanistan remain to be taken care of, and there are years of heavy activity and at times declining recruitment to recover from. While there are substantial benefits to a battle-hardened military accustomed to a high deployment tempo, this also has its costs — reset costs will be high. A very real domestic military shake-up looms on the one- to two-year horizon in order to bring the Pentagon back into line with fiscal and procurement realities, coupled with concerns about midlevel officer retention. But the Pentagon’s thinking and strategic guidance already have moved toward cooperative security and toward working more closely with allies and partners to stabilize and manage the global security environment, with an emphasis on requiring foreign participation and burden-sharing.

A Greater Security Role for Allies and a Centralized Foreign Policy
Obama will also work on managing the U.S. image abroad. Opposition to Bush and opposition to the war in Iraq often became synonymous internationally, evolving intentionally or otherwise into broader anti-war and anti-military sentiments. Rebuilding the military’s image internationally will not happen overnight. Part of the process will involve using the sense of change inherent in any new U.S. administration to push allies and others to take on a greater role in global security.

In Asia, for example, Clinton will call on Tokyo and Seoul to step up operations in Afghanistan, particularly in reconstruction and development efforts. But Tokyo and Seoul also will be called on to take a greater role in regional security — Seoul on the Korean Peninsula and Tokyo as a more active military ally overall. The same message will be sent to Europe and elsewhere: If you want a multilateral United States, you will have to take up the slack and participate in multilateral operations. The multilateral mantra will not be one in which the United States does what others say, but rather one in which the United States holds others to the task. In the end, this will reduce U.S. commitments abroad, allowing the military to refocus on its core competencies and rebuild its strength.

A strong military thus forms the foundation of any foreign policy. Obama’s foreign policy approach is largely centralized in a bid for a wider approach. Taking China as an example, for the last half-dozen years, U.S. policy on China was based almost entirely on economics. The U.S. Treasury Department took the lead in China relations, while other issues — everything from Chinese military developments to Beijing’s growing presence in Africa and Latin America to human rights — took a back seat. While the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (or something similar) will remain a major pillar of U.S.-China relations under Obama, equally important parallel tracks will focus on military and security issues, nontraditional threats, politics and human rights. This multifaceted approach will require close co operation among numerous departments and divisions to avoid the chaos seen in things like U.S. policy on North Korea.

This coordination will take place in an expanded NSC, one that brings in the economic elements on equal footing with security and political concerns. Combined with the appointment of special envoys for critical regions, this is intended to ensure a more unified and complete approach to foreign policy. This way, Obama retains oversight over policy, while his erstwhile rival Clinton is just one voice at the table. The State Department’s role thus becomes more about image management and development.

Accordingly, Clinton’s foreign travels are less about shaping foreign policy than shaping foreign images of the United States. She is demonstrating the new consultative nature of the administration by going everywhere and listening to everyone. Meanwhile, the hard-hitting foreign policy initiatives go to the special envoys, who can dedicate their time and energy to just one topic. Holbrooke got South Asia, Mitchell got the Middle East, and there are indications that managing overall China strategy will fall to Biden, at least in the near term.

Other special envoys and special representatives might emerge, some technically reporting through the State Department, others to other departments, but all effectively reporting back to the NSC and the president. In theory, this will mitigate the kind of bickering between the State Department and NSC that characterized Bush’s first term (a concern hardly limited to the most recent ex-president). And to keep it busy, the State Department has been tasked with rebuilding the U.S. Agency for International Development or an equivalent program for taking reconstruction and development programs, slowly freeing the military from the reconstruction business.

As Clinton heads to Asia, then, the expectations of Asian allies and China of a newfound American appreciation for the Far East might be a bit misplaced. Certainly, this is the first time in a long while that a secretary of state has visited Asia before Europe. But given the role of the vice president and the special envoys, the visit might not reflect policy priorities so much as a desire to ensure that all regions get visits. Clinton’s agenda in each country might not offer an entirely accurate reading of U.S. policy initiatives for the region, either, as much of the policy is still up for review, and her primary responsibility is to demonstrate a new and more interactive face of American foreign policy.

Clinton’s Asia visit is significant largely because it highlights a piece of the evolving Obama foreign policy — a policy that remains centralized under the president via the NSC, and that uses dedicated special envoys and representatives to focus on key trouble spots (and perhaps to avoid some of the interagency bickering that can limit the agencies’ freedom to maneuver). Most importantly, this policy at its core looks to rebuild the sense and reality of American military strength through disengaging from apparently intractable situations, focusing on core competencies rather than reconstruction or nation-building, and calling on allies to take up the slack in security responsibilities. This is what is shaping the first priority for the Obama administration: withdrawal from Iraq not just to demonstrate a different approach than the last president, but also to ensure that the military is ready for use elsewhere.

Obama’s ‘major Islamic forum’ meeting should be held in Bangladesh?

This came from Seth Mandel, Managing Editor, The Jewish State. Notwithstanding his stronger support for beleaguered Bangladeshi journalist Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, this article is worth reading. Below are some relevant texts:

On Aug. 1, 2007, President Barack Obama (then a candidate and senator) told a Washington, D.C. audience that in his first 100 days as president, he would take a bold step toward reforming our communication with the Muslim world. He would, he said, “travel to a major Islamic forum and deliver an address to redefine our struggle.” Since then, various news outlets, columnists, talking heads, and bloggers speculated on which Muslim country that would be, and offered their own suggestions. [Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Iraq, and Afghanistan have been common suggestions.]

So, now that Obama is our president, let me offer my counsel: the address should be given in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Bangladesh’s recent political turmoil is headspinning. In late 2006/early 2007, the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, was busy rigging the elections scheduled for January 2007. The Bangladeshi army responded by staging an unannounced coup, running a caretaker government, and expelling both Zia and the opposition Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina Wajed. But as Americans began to celebrate the New Year of 2009, Bangladeshis were counting the votes in an election so much cleaner than usual that the Economist opened its post-election article thus: “It went better than anyone dared hope.”

The election was a landslide in favor of Awami League. And if the symbolism of any election could compete with Obama’s, it was this one. Sheikh Hasina is the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s independence leader, founding father, and first president.

In addition, BNP has Islamist political allies, and the army’s order-and-command tunnel vision prevented it from crossing the country’s Islamists during its own caretaker administration. Though Awami has run corrupt governments itself in the past, its massive victory was an almost shocking step away from Islamist control. Being that 70 percent of Bangladesh’s registered voters participated in the election, that step may have been a public referendum on radical Islam as well—though it’s too soon to know for sure.

In all, the Bangladeshi election was a vivid demonstration of exactly what the West hopes Muslim countries will do: hold free and fair elections, and move toward a moderate expression of Islam’s tenets.

That is one reason Obama should speak in Bangladesh. There is much work to be done still in Bangladesh, and Obama can simultaneously commend its progress while recognizing its challenges.

The full story is here.

Obama faulters in oath taking

Millions have seen it live. Obama faultered in uttering correct words during oath-taking.

The original oath should have been like this:
"I Barrack Hussein Obama do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States and will to the best of my ability..."

Here what Obama said during oath:

"I Barrack Hussein Obama do solemnly swear that I will execute the Office of the President of the Unites States faithfully and will to the best of my ability..."

The full video is here.

Does it matter? Well, look at the differences and make your own choice.

Obama-the other side

People around the world have been fooled often, and this time it will be no exception. Read the other side, from a premier conspiracy site. It is easy to be dismissive, but pause for a while and make your own judgement.

Obama plan for South Asia envoy

Aziz Haniffa in Washington writes in rediff news:

Leading South Asia analysts are divided over the incoming Obama administration's likely decision to appoint a special envoy for South Asia. Critical opinion is split three ways: Some argue that such an envoy should concentrate only on Afghanistan and Pakistan; another section holds that India should be included and that a discussion on Kashmir is inevitable; and a third section of opinion contends that the whole idea is misguided.

Dennis Kux, a senior fellow at the Washington, DC think-tank Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and author of the seminal Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, believes a special envoy would be a good idea.

"I believe there ought to be somebody in the White House who is looking at South Asia, who has more authority than the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, and who devotes all his time to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the India-Pakistan problem," he said.

While Pakistan and Afghanistan are priority, Kux says, India is important because "one has an effect on the other, so it all ties together. And one cannot deny that in looking at India-Pakistan problems, the Kashmir dispute is the main problem. It does not mean that you have to be there beating up on people or what have you, but just that you have a focal point in the US government; that there is unity of thought and unity of policy."

Kux believes that a special envoy solves the existing problem, "where the State Department is going one way, the Pentagon the other, etc."

Dr Stephen P Cohen, who heads the South Asia programme at the Brookings Institution, another Washington, DC think-tank, says there is a need for a special envoy, whose brief extends to the entire region. "Assistant secretaries of state have become mere country directors and the problems are so great. Anyway, the Obama style is to have special emissaries and that means the Assistant Secretary for South Asia will be managers for just Nepal and Sri Lanka and maybe Bangladesh."

The trick, says Cohen, is to pick the right envoy. "That is 98 percent of the issue. If it is someone who charges in there and bullies people, he might not get very far in any country in the region."

Former career diplomat Richard Holbrooke's name is the one most often cited as the likely envoy. "I don't know if that personality (Holbrooke) is going to match up with the problems of the region," Cohen says, adding that he would prefer someone like former US ambassador to India Thomas Pickering.

Interestingly, Holbrooke has of late been travelling regularly to Afghanistan and being briefed by noted Afghanistan expert Professor Marvin Weinbaum. The Obama team is believed to be "impressed by his views on Afghanistan" and on how to take a "regional approach that includes India."

Cohen is not similarly impressed. "Just because you are an expert in one area doesn't mean you'll be an expert in all areas," the South Asia expert says. Referring to India's voiced objections to the appointment of such an envoy, Cohen says "India should not be averse to a special envoy talking about Kashmir. It's still a problem for India and it involves China too. It's not simply Pakistan. And I think it should be legitimate for other countries to be concerned about this."

He warns, however, that it is counter-productive for the envoy, when named, to twist India's arm in a bid to solve the Kashmir problem. "But if the Indians can find a way out of this and if the outsiders can help, they should welcome it and I think they've been foolish in taking a hard-nosed position on this."

On the subject of Afghanistan, Cohen argues that any administration strategy has to take the wide angle view, and should include neighbours like India, Iran and even China. Acknowledging the paranoia in Pakistan regarding India's role in Afghanistan, Cohen said, "Every time I go to Pakistan, they lecture me about the 25 Indian consulates in Afghanistan. I understand from both Indian and American officials that in fact the Indian presence is not that great, that the Pakistanis are wildly exaggerating it. Maybe that's the Indian purpose ?akes the Pakistanis think they are doing something."

He says it is counterproductive for India and Pakistan to continue their cold war in Afghanistan, where the US has vital interests. The two countries should instead realise their common interest in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, he argues, "because it could otherwise keep spilling into their own countries."

Harlan Kenneth Ullman, senior associate with the Centre of Strategic and International Studies, is also in favour of the idea of a special envoy, whose brief is a regional approach that includes Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Ullman, who has close links with Pakistani government officials, military leaders and intelligence officers, believes the insurgency in Afghanistan "is getting worse and the situation is deteriorating, and this extends obviously to Pakistan because what happens in Afghanistan fuels what is happening in Pakistan, and the insurgency is heading East --there is no doubt it's heading to India."

"The only way you are going to take it on is regional -- you are going to need to involve China, and Russia and Iran and the Gulf and Saudi Arabia and other States."

Ullman recommends as special envoy someone like former general and ex-National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who is very knowledgeable of the region. Taking a swipe at Holbrooke, whose stellar moment was his negotiations on the Bosnia-Serbia crisis, Ullman said, "If you get someone whose experience is entirely in Europe, I don't think that would be the appropriate person. You need somebody who is well known to the region because the issues are too complicated, too inter-related and frankly too difficult for someone to learn on the trot."

Ullman thus recommends Scowcroft, Pickering, or someone on those lines who "has stature and the understanding of the region. You have to give them a mission. One is to promote peace and stability and prosperity. That means there has to be some link back to financial aid from the United States, and it also needs to be closely linked with Central Command, because in this case there has to be a combination of military force as well as the more important issue of civilian aid and help and that has to be the goal."

Former CIA South Asia analyst Lisa Curtis, currently a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, and Gary Samore, vice president and director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, were, however, opposed to the appointment of a special envoy.

Curtis warned that such an appointment would be "misguided", and that "raising the spectre of international intervention in the Kashmir dispute could fuel unrealistic expectations in Pakistan for a final settlement in its favour." Consequently, she said it would compound the problem in encouraging Pakistan "to increasing its support for Kashmiri militants to push an agenda it believed was within reach."

She said such a brief for the envoy could signal to New Delhi that Washington is "reverting to policies that view India only through the South Asia lens rather than as the rising power that it is." This, she said, could be counterproductive to the Obama administration's efforts to "build on major gains the Bush team made in improving what Vice President-elect Joe Biden himself called one of the most important bilateral relationships for the US in the 21st century."

Samore for his part believes the brief for a special envoy should be limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan and should not include India. He, and all other experts interviewed for this story, are unanimous however that the November 26 terror attacks in Mumbai has made South Asia an immediate priority for the incoming administration.

The Obama administration, Kux said, has its work cut out to lower the temperature between India and Pakistan "so that the Pakistanis continue to focus on the Western and not the Eastern border. One way to do that ?gh it "will take some doing" ?o try and revive the India-Pakistan composite dialogue as soon as possible. "With elections coming up in India, though, and with the (Prime Minister) Manmohan Singh government not wishing to appear namby-pamby, it becomes more difficult."

Obama enters the great game

Sorry for the long post, but it is worth reading, courtesy of Stratfor.
U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will be sworn in on Tuesday as
president of the United States. Candidate Obama said much about
what he would do as president; now we will see what President
Obama actually does. The most important issue Obama will face
will be the economy, something he did not anticipate through most
of his campaign. The first hundred days of his presidency thus
will revolve around getting a stimulus package passed. But Obama
also is now in the great game of global competition and in that
game, presidents rarely get to set the agenda.

The major challenge he faces is not Gaza; the Israeli-Palestinian
dispute is not one any U.S. president intervenes in unless he
wants to experience pain. As we have explained, that is an
intractable conflict to which there is no real solution.
Certainly, Obama will fight being drawn into mediating the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his first hundred days in
office. He undoubtedly will send the obligatory Middle East
envoy, who will spend time with all the parties, make suitable
speeches and extract meaningless concessions from all sides. This
envoy will establish some sort of process to which everyone will
cynically commit, knowing it will go nowhere. Such a mission is
not involvement it is the alternative to involvement, and the
reason presidents appoint Middle East envoys. Obama can avoid the
Gaza crisis, and he will do so.

Obama's Two Unavoidable Crises

The two crises that cannot be avoided are Afghanistan and Russia.
First, the situation in Afghanistan is tenuous for a number of
reasons, and it is not a crisis that Obama can avoid decisions
on. Obama has said publicly that he will decrease his commitments
in Iraq and increase them in Afghanistan. He thus will have more
troops fighting in Afghanistan. The second crisis emerged from a
decision by Russia to cut off natural gas to Ukraine, and the
resulting decline in natural gas deliveries to Europe. This one
obviously does not affect the United States directly, but even
after flows are restored, it affects the Europeans greatly. Obama
therefore comes into office with three interlocking issues:
Afghanistan, Russia and Europe. In one sense, this is a single
issue and it is not one that will wait.

Obama clearly intends to follow Gen. David Petraeus? lead in
Afghanistan. The intention is to increase the number of troops in
Afghanistan, thereby intensifying pressure on the Taliban and
opening the door for negotiations with the militant group or one
of its factions. Ultimately, this would see the inclusion of the
Taliban or Taliban elements in a coalition government. Petraeus
pursued this strategy in Iraq with Sunni insurgents, and it is
the likely strategy in Afghanistan.

But the situation in Afghanistan has been complicated by the
situation in Pakistan. Roughly three-quarters of U.S. and NATO
supplies bound for Afghanistan are delivered to the Pakistani
port of Karachi and trucked over the border to Afghanistan. Most
fuel used by Western forces in Afghanistan is refined in Pakistan
and delivered via the same route. There are two crossing points,
one near Afghanistan's Kandahar province at Chaman, Pakistan, and
the other through the Khyber Pass. The Taliban have attacked
Western supply depots and convoys, and Pakistan itself closed the
routes for several days, citing government operations a gainst
radical Islamist forces.

Meanwhile, the situation in Pakistan has been complicated by
tensions with India. The Indians have said that the individuals
who carried out the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack were Pakistanis
supported by elements in the Pakistani government. After Mumbai,
India made demands of the Pakistanis. While the situation appears
to have calmed, the future of Indo-Pakistani relations remains
far from clear; anything from a change of policy in New Delhi to
new terrorist attacks could see the situation escalate. The
Pakistanis have made it clear that a heightened threat from India
requires them to shift troops away from the Afghan border and
toward the east; a small number of troops already has been
shifted.

Apart from the direct impact this kind of Pakistani troop
withdrawal would have on cross-border operations by the Taliban,
such a move also would dramatically increase the vulnerability of
NATO supply lines through Pakistan. Some supplies could be
shipped in by aircraft, but the vast bulk of supplies ?
petroleum, ammunition, etc. must come in via surface transit,
either by truck, rail or ship. Western operations in Afghanistan
simply cannot be supplied from the air alone. A cutoff of the
supply lines across Pakistan would thus leave U.S. troops in
Afghanistan in crisis. Because Washington can't predict or
control the future actions of Pakistan, of India or of
terrorists, the United States must find an alternative to the
routes through Pakistan.

When we look at a map, the two routes through Pakistan from
Karachi are clearly the most logical to use. If those were closed
or even meaningfully degraded the only other viable routes
would be through the former Soviet Union.

One route, along which a light load of fuel is currently
transported, crosses the Caspian Sea. Fuel refined in Armenia is
ferried across the Caspian to Turkmenistan (where a small amount
of fuel is also refined), then shipped across Turkmenistan
directly to Afghanistan and through a small spit of land in
Uzbekistan. This route could be expanded to reach either the
Black Sea through Georgia or the Mediterranean through Georgia
and Turkey (though the additional use of Turkey would require a
rail gauge switch). It is also not clear that transports native
to the Caspian have sufficient capacity for this.

Another route sidesteps the issues of both transport across the
Caspian and the sensitivity of Georgia by crossing Russian
territory above the Caspian. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan (and likely
at least a small corner of Turkmenistan) would connect the route
to Afghanistan. There are options of connecting to the Black Sea
or transiting to Europe through either Ukraine or Belarus.
Iran could provide a potential alternative, but relations between
Tehran and Washington would have to improve dramatically before
such discussions could even begin and time is short.

Many of the details still need to be worked out. But they are
largely variations on the two main themes of either crossing the
Caspian or transiting Russian territory above it.

Though the first route is already partially established for fuel,
it is not clear how much additional capacity exists. To
complicate matters further, Turkmen acquiescence is unlikely
without Russian authorization, and Armenia remains strongly loyal
to Moscow as well. While the current Georgian government might
leap at the chance, the issue is obviously an extremely sensitive
one for Moscow. (And with Russian forces positioned in Azerbaijan
and the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
Moscow has troops looming over both sides of the vulnerable route
across Georgia.) The second option would require crossing Russian
territory itself, with a number of options ? from connecting to
the Black Sea to transiting either Ukraine or Belarus to Europe,
or connecting to the Baltic states.

Both routes involve countries of importance to Russia where
Moscow has influence, regardless of whether those countries are
friendly to it. This would give Russia ample opportunity to
scuttle any such supply line at multiple points for reasons
wholly unrelated to Afghanistan.

If the West were to opt for the first route, the Russians almost
certainly would pressure Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan not to
cooperate, and Turkey would find itself in a position it doesn't
want to be in namely, caught between the United States and
Russia. The diplomatic complexities of developing these routes
not only involve the individual countries included, they also
inevitably lead to the question of U.S.-Russian relations.

Even without crossing Russia, both of these two main options
require Russian cooperation. The United States must develop the
option of an alternative supply route to Pakistan, and in doing
so, it must define its relationship with Russia. Seeking to work
without Russian approval of a route crossing its ?near abroad?
will represent a challenge to Russia. But getting Russian
approval will require a U.S. accommodation with the country.
The Russian Natural Gas Connection

One of Obama's core arguments against the Bush administration was
that it acted unilaterally rather than with allies. Specifically,
Obama meant that the Bush administration alienated the Europeans,
therefore failing to build a sustainable coalition for the war.
By this logic, it follows that one of Obama's first steps should
be to reach out to Europe to help influence or pressure the
Russians, given that NATO has troops in Afghanistan and Obama has
said he intends to ask the Europeans for more help there.

The problem with this is that the Europeans are passing through a
serious crisis with Russia, and that Germany in particular is
involved in trying to manage that crisis. This problem relates to
natural gas. Ukraine is dependent on Russia for about two-thirds
of the natural gas it uses. The Russians traditionally have
provided natural gas at a deep discount to former Soviet
republics, primarily those countries Russia sees as allies, such
as Belarus or Armenia. Ukraine had received discounted natural
gas, too, until the 2004 Orange Revolution, when a pro-Western
government came to power in Kiev. At that point, the Russians
began demanding full payment. Given the subsequent rises in
global energy prices, that left Ukraine in a terrible situation
which of course is exactly where Moscow wanted it.

The Russians cut off natural gas to Ukraine for a short period in
January 2006, and for three weeks in 2009. Apart from leaving
Ukraine desperate, the cutoff immediately affected the rest of
Europe, because the natural gas that goes to Europe flows through
Ukraine. This put the rest of Europe in a dangerous position,
particularly in the face of bitterly cold weather in 2008-2009.

The Russians achieved several goals with this. First, they
pressured Ukraine directly. Second, they forced many European
states to deal with Moscow directly rather than through the
European Union. Third, they created a situation in which European
countries had to choose between supporting Ukraine and heating
their own homes. And last, they drew Berlin in particular since
Germany is the most dependent of the major European states on
Russian natural gas into the position of working with the
Russians to get Ukraine to agree to their terms. (Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin visited Germany last week to discuss this
directly with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.)

The Germans already have made clear their opposition to expanding
NATO to Ukraine and Georgia. Given their dependency on the
Russians, the Germans are not going to be supporting the United
States if Washington decides to challenge Russia over the supply
route issue. In fact, the Germans and many of the Europeans
are in no position to challenge Russia on anything, least of all
on Afghanistan. Overall, the Europeans see themselves as having
limited interests in the Afghan war, and many already are
planning to reduce or withdraw troops for budgetary reasons.

It is therefore very difficult to see Obama recruiting the
Europeans in any useful manner for a confrontation with Russia
over access for American supplies to Afghanistan. Yet this is an
issue he will have to address immediately.

The Price of Russian Cooperation

The Russians are prepared to help the Americans, however and it
is clear what they will want in return.

At minimum, Moscow will want a declaration that Washington will
not press for the expansion of NATO to Georgia or Ukraine, or for
the deployment of military forces in non-NATO states on the
Russian periphery specifically, Ukraine and Georgia. At this
point, such a declaration would be symbolic, since Germany and
other European countries would block expansion anyway.

The Russians might also demand some sort of guarantee that NATO
and the United States not place any large military formations or
build any major military facilities in the former Soviet
republics (now NATO member states) of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania. (A small rotating squadron of NATO fighters already
patrols the skies over the Baltic states.) Given that there were
intense anti-government riots in Latvia and Lithuania last week,
the stability of these countries is in question. The Russians
would certainly want to topple the pro-Western Baltic
governments. And anything approaching a formal agreement between
Russia and the United States on the matter could quickly
destabilize the Baltics, in addition to very much weakening the
NATO alliance.

Another demand the Russians probably will make because they
have in the past is that the United States guarantee eventual
withdrawal from any bases in Central Asia in return for Russian
support for using those bases for the current Afghan campaign.
(At present, the United States runs air logistics operations out
of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan.) The Russians do not want to see
Central Asia become a U.S. sphere of influence as the result of
an American military presence.

Other demands might relate to the proposed U.S. ballistic missile
defense installations in the Czech Republic and Poland.

We expect the Russians to make variations on all these demands in
exchange for cooperation in creating a supply line to
Afghanistan. Simply put, the Russians will demand that the United
States acknowledge a Russian sphere of influence in the former
Soviet Union. The Americans will not want to concede this or at
least will want to make it implicit rather than explicit. But the
Russians will want this explicit, because an explicit guarantee
will create a crisis of confidence over U.S. guarantees in the
countries that emerged from the Soviet Union, serving as a lever
to draw these countries into the Russian orbit. U.S. acquiescence
on the point potentially would have ripple effects in the rest of
Europe, too.

Therefore, regardless of the global financial crisis, Obama has
an immediate problem on his hands in Afghanistan. He has troops
fighting there, and they must be supplied. The Pakistani supply
line is no longer a sure thing. The only other options either
directly challenge Russia (and ineffectively at that) or require
Russian help. Russia's price will be high, particularly because
Washington?s European allies will not back a challenge to Russia
in Georgia, and all options require Russian cooperation anyway.
Obama's plan to recruit the Europeans on behalf of American
initiatives won't work in this case. Obama does not want to start
his administration with making a massive concession to Russia,
but he cannot afford to leave U.S. forces in Afghanistan without
supplies. He can hope that nothing happens in Pakistan, but that
is up to the Taliban and other Islamist groups more than anyone
else and betting on their goodwill is not a good idea.

Whatever Obama is planning to do, he will have to deal with this
problem fast, before Afghanistan becomes a crisis. And there are
no good solutions. But unlike with the Israelis and Palestinians,
Obama can?t solve this by sending a special envoy who appears to
be doing something. He will have to make a very tough decision.
Between the economy and this crisis, we will find out what kind
of president Obama is.

And we will find out very soon.